The dawn that followed the dark and frigid night of December 15, 1944, was foggy, dreary, and foreboding to the troops of the VIII Corps in their positions along the front line between Echternach and just south of Konschau in Belgium, a distance of approximately 75 miles, facing the defensive structures the Germans called the Siegfried Line. It had been a quite sector since early October, and the American front was thinly held, with three infantry division on the line and an armored division in reserve. But it would have been “thinly held” if it had twice those troops, consisting as it did of widely separated strong points connected generally by a few motorized patrols.
But there was no strong or aggressive force facing them, at least in the supposedly trained judgment of unit, divisional, and corps intelligence. They were consequently taking what general Eisenhower described as a “calculated risk” when he had depleted VIII Corps’ strength by numerous units to assist Field Marshal Montgomery’s planned attack in the north.
However the risk must have considered extremely slight, for commanders all the way down the line were urged to make their men comfortable for the hard winter ahead, and to take measures to reduce the serious problem of trench foot, a disabling disorder resulting from repeatedly wet feet in very cold wet weather. As a result of this, there was a considerable lessening of aggressive patrolling which, combined with weather that completely precluded any air observation, meant that very little intelligence was being gathered. Read more
